Part 5: Posture at machine speed
Part 5 of 5 in a deep dive on how quantum computing and AI are breaking cryptography from two directions. Start with Part 1 if you are new to the series.
Two lanes
Some cryptographic decisions should stay slow and deliberate: which algorithms and parameters to adopt, how to run a root key ceremony, when to change HSM firmware. Boneh's warning about rushed migrations applies here, because a mistake in this lane is expensive and hard to undo. Everything else, from patching a library to tightening an approval rule, should move continuously.
I would split the work into two lanes with different rules. Governance decides what belongs in each lane and who may approve changes in it, and leaves the speed of the fast lane to the engineering teams.
Deliberate lane
Rare, high-impact, hard to reverseContinuous lane
Frequent, small, reversibleSeven practices for both clocks
1. Inventory continuously and remove first
Every migration plan starts with knowing where cryptography lives. OMB's M-26-15 calls the cryptographic inventory the foundation of an agency's plan and expects it to be continuously updated, with automated discovery. Rebuild yours from code, certificates, cloud configuration and HSM logs, and use AI-assisted scanning to find every call to RSA or elliptic curves, every hard-coded key and every RSA-1024 certificate still in service.
Then apply Taleb's via negativa. In his letter he argues that the effects of adding something new are hard to predict, while the effect of removing something that was not historically part of a system can be predicted. Removing RSA-1024 keys, unused certificates, reused addresses and standing signing permissions shrinks the attack surface with no new code. Do that before adding anything.
2. Make algorithms configuration, not code
Crypto-agility means that swapping an algorithm, a parameter set or a broken library is a configuration change and a redeploy. Route cryptographic operations through one internal interface, version your key and certificate formats, and test the swap path before you need it. The first post-quantum implementations will have bugs, as KyberSlash showed, and agility is how you replace them in days.
3. Hybrid key exchange now, signatures next
Harvest now, decrypt later threatens confidentiality today, so key exchange moves first, as a hybrid of X25519, today's standard elliptic-curve key exchange, and ML-KEM. A hybrid stays secure if either half holds. NIST's IR 8547 supports hybrid schemes during the transition, and Cloudflare reports that over 65% of human traffic to its network is already post-quantum encrypted.
Signatures come next. Google and Cloudflare both target 2029 and have moved authentication up their priority lists, because forged signatures would let an attacker impersonate trusted services. Start with the longest-lived keys: roots, firmware signing, and anything whose public key is published permanently. Keep the classical half of the hybrid for as long as the standards allow. In July a young post-quantum candidate, HAWK, lost 26 of its 64 bits of security on its challenge parameters to about 60 hours of model work.
4. Shrink quantum exposure in custody
For anyone holding digital assets, the cheapest quantum defense is hygiene. Google's paper recommends that holders stop exposing and reusing vulnerable addresses. Move funds out of outputs whose public keys are on-chain, know which institutional wallets have exposed keys, and plan their move to quantum-resistant outputs once the protocols allow it. Europol reached the same conclusion in October. For keys already exposed, it found pre-emptive migration to be the only remedy. A hardware wallet protects the private key; only the way you use addresses protects the public one.
5. Verify intent, not identity
Deepfakes break any control built on recognizing a face or a voice. The Arup worker recognized his colleagues on the call, and he moved $25.6 million because of it. The Fideuram fraud and the $129 million US indictment used the same pattern: a written request in a senior person's name, then a call in an AI-cloned voice to confirm it. Replace recognition with checks an impersonator cannot pass: call-backs to numbers held on file, quorum approval for large transfers, limits that one person cannot raise, and clear signing that shows the approver what will happen. This is the intent-safety layer from the hardware wallet deep dive, extended to every human approval.
6. Point AI at your own code first
The same class of models attackers use can scan your stack before they do. Anthropic reports that enterprises using its Claude Security tool, built on the generally available Claude Opus 4.7, patched over 2,100 vulnerabilities in three weeks. Fund the fix pipeline along with the finding pipeline: an owner per finding, an agreed fix time by severity, and a fast lane to production.
The same models can also prove properties of code. In October, Anthropic and the verification company Theorem reported that Claude produced machine-checked proofs that 239 fuzz-test entry points in 123 open-source libraries cannot crash on inputs under 64 MB. A fuzz-test entry point is a function that automated testing feeds with random inputs. The proofs hold at the level of compiled RISC-V code, and the work found hundreds of bugs on the way. KyberSlash was first noticed by a team writing a formally verified Kyber. Anthropic expects better models and reusable proofs to keep lowering the cost of this kind of verification.
7. Split authority and keep humans on irreversible steps
Taleb's first precautionary rule in the letter is to split sources of harm, because harm grows faster than size. At Binance, attackers who reached one internal signing service moved $6.34 billion. Let automation handle detection, low-risk changes and routine rotation. Keep a human quorum on the actions that cannot be undone: moving funds above a threshold, operating root keys, changing approval policy, and granting signing authority to an AI agent. Anthropic's threat report recommends treating AI keys and agent integrations as production credentials. At Binance an internal AI tool was one step on the path to the signing service. RBC, TD and BMO now bar outside agents from logged-in banking, and CIBC tells clients not to share banking credentials with them.
| Layer | Post-quantum migration | Continuous AI scanning | Crypto-agility | Intent verification | Human quorum |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Math | |||||
| Implementation | |||||
| Configuration | |||||
| Key lifecycle | |||||
| People | |||||
| Automation |
A post-quantum migration on its own protects the math and does nothing for the five layers around it.
Where to start
Math safety
Build the inventory and remove what you no longer need. Turn on hybrid key exchange wherever your stack supports it. Plan signature migration for roots and firmware first. Move custody funds out of outputs with exposed public keys.
Process speed
Measure the time from disclosure to a deployed patch for your cryptographic libraries, set a target in days, and give that lane pre-approved changes. Put a human quorum on every irreversible action, including any signing authority granted to an AI agent.
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