Zenpanik
The key that stays and the key that travels: where a passkey lives on an iPhone and a MacBy Pavel Nikolov, November 12, 2026

Part 3, continued: The key that travels

Part 3 of 5, second half, in a deep dive on where a passkey lives on an iPhone and a Mac, and what the Secure Enclave, Touch ID and Face ID do for it. Start with Part 1 if you are new to the series.

What a backup carries

A backup is another way keychain data leaves a device, and it shows the UID rule plainly. Anything wrapped under one chip’s UID is unreadable on another chip. A backup that should restore to a new phone therefore has to take the items out of the UID chain and wrap them under something that can travel.

For a local backup made through the Finder, that something is the backup password. A keybag is Apple’s name for a bundle of class keys. Apple writes that for an encrypted backup a new keybag is created with a new set of keys, the backed-up data is re-encrypted to those keys, and the keybag is protected by the password run through 10 million rounds of PBKDF2, a function that makes each guess slow on purpose. Apple states the consequence: keychain items migrate to a new device only if a backup password is set.

Without a password the backup still contains the keychain, protected with a UID-derived key. It restores to the device it came from and to no other. Items marked “This device only” behave that way even in a password-protected backup. Apple writes that they remain wrapped with the UID-derived key, which makes them inaccessible on a different device.

Old iPhoneBackup file on a computerNew iPhone1. No backup password: the whole keychainUnreadable. It needs the old chip’s UID2. Backup password set: items allowed to migrateOpens, then is wrapped under the new chip’s UID3. Items marked “this device only”, password or notUnreadable. It needs the old chip’s UID
Wrapped under a chip’s UIDWrapped under the backup password
Figure 11. Three ways through a local backup. Keychain items reach a new device only when a backup password re-wraps them for the trip. Schematic. Source: Keybags for Data Protection.

The password-protected backup pays for its portability. Apple notes that it has no tie to a specific device, so an attacker who obtains the file could run guesses in parallel on many computers. The ten-attempt counter from Part 2 does not apply, because the UID is no longer in the formula. With 106 possibilities and no limit on tries, a six-digit backup password is weak however slow each guess is made. Apple’s answer is a sufficiently strong password.

iCloud Keychain passkeys do not depend on local backups. They reach a new device through sync or escrow, and the new device wraps them under its own UID on arrival. The pattern is the same in every case. To leave a device, a key has to be re-wrapped under something that travels, and a key that cannot be re-wrapped stays behind.

If the chip dies

The same rule covers the case where the enclave itself fails and its UID is gone. Nothing can restore that key. Apple says the UID isn’t available to Apple or any of its suppliers, so by Apple’s account no copy exists, and moving the storage to another device leaves the files inaccessible. A repair that replaces the chip gives the device a new UID, and to the old data that is a different device.

A dead enclave therefore counts as a lost device, and the outcome depends on what had already left. iCloud Keychain passkeys survive on your other devices or through escrow. A password-protected backup survives, because it was re-wrapped under the backup password. The keychain inside a backup made without a password is lost, along with device-only items and keys created inside the enclave. The key that stays cannot be copied out and cannot be saved, which is why Part 5 asks for a second hardware key wherever you rely on one.

This deviceSecure Enclaveand its UIDKeychain and files on its storageUnreadable without the UIDCopies that left the deviceiCloud Keychain copySurvives on your other devices or through escrowBackup with a passwordSurvives, wrapped under the backup passwordBackup without a passwordIts keychain is lost, wrapped under the dead UID
Wrapped under this chip’s UIDWrapped under the backup passwordEncrypted for the circle of trust
Figure 12. When the enclave fails, everything wrapped under its UID goes with it. Copies that were re-wrapped for iCloud or under a backup password survive. Schematic. Sources: The Secure Enclave, Keybags for Data Protection, About the security of passkeys.

Sharing and export

Two more doors lead out of the keychain. You can share a passkey with another person. Apple says iCloud Keychain can share passwords and passkeys with people you trust. And since iOS 26 you can move passkeys to a different password manager.

2022

Passkeys launch, with sync

Apple introduced passkeys at its developer conference in June 2022 with iCloud Keychain sync built in. The early discussion on Michael Tsai’s blog shows how unclear the storage model was. One developer assumed a new key pair per device inside the enclave, another assumed a synced key, and readers asked how a Mac without an enclave could take part.

2025

iOS 26 adds export

Apple announced in June 2025 that iOS 26 and macOS Tahoe 26 would import and export passkeys using a data format from the FIDO Alliance. Bitwarden wrote on September 15, 2025 that iOS 26 was the first major platform to implement the exchange protocol. Apple engineer Andrew Abosh said in the conference session, as quoted by iDrop News, that the transfer runs directly between apps after Face ID approval and that “no insecure files are created on disk”.

2026

Android follows

On July 23, 2026, Bitwarden reported that Android now supports the same exchange protocol through a Google Play Services update. The same protocol now runs on both mobile platforms.

2025

NIST draws the line

The US standards agency accepts synced passkeys at its middle assurance level, AAL2. For the top level it writes that “syncing violates the non-exportability requirements of AAL3”. Part 4 returns to what that means for a bank.

Export is the strongest evidence on the storage question. A key that the Passwords app can hand to Bitwarden after a Face ID check is not locked inside a chip. What the chip locks is the box the key rests in on each device, and what Face ID controls is when that box opens.

Continue to Part 4: One sign-in, two keys