Part 5: What to do
Part 5 of 5 in a deep dive on where a passkey lives on an iPhone and a Mac, and what the Secure Enclave, Touch ID and Face ID do for it. Start with Part 1 if you are new to the series.
Two kinds of key for two kinds of account
Parts 2 to 4 leave a simple division. A synced passkey is hard to phish and hard to lose, and it is as strong as the weakest device passcode in your circle. A device-bound key is hard to phish and hard to copy, and it is as available as the piece of hardware it lives in. I would use both, and decide account by account.
Synced passkey
The key that travelsDevice-bound key
The key that staysSeven practices
The first five are for your own iPhone and Mac. The last two are for a team whose product accepts passkeys.
1. Lengthen the passcode
The passcode unlocks the device, by default replaces Face ID whenever someone chooses, and is the last factor in escrow recovery. Everything in the keychain depends on it. A random six-digit passcode gives an attacker with ten tries a 1 in 100,000 chance. A random ten-character passcode of letters and digits has 3610, about 3.7 × 1015, possible values, which puts the same ten tries at roughly 1 in 366 trillion. Face ID means you type it far less often than you unlock the phone, so the cost of a long one is small. The rule covers every device in the circle, including the Mac’s login password. If you keep password-protected local backups, the backup password needs the same care, because no attempt limit protects that file.
2. Turn on Stolen Device Protection, set to Always
On an iPhone this addresses the fourth row of the attacker table in Part 4. With it on, using passwords or passkeys saved in the keychain needs Face ID or Touch ID with no passcode alternative, and changing the passcode or the Apple Account password needs a wait and a second match. The default applies those rules only away from familiar locations. A thief who follows you home, or a person who lives with you, is inside a familiar location, so I would choose Always.
3. Guard the account and its recovery
Apple requires two-factor authentication for any account that uses iCloud Keychain, and recovery runs through an SMS to your registered number. Keep that number current and under your control. Add an account recovery contact, which Apple offers so that you can get back in after forgetting the account password or the device passcode. The escrow record survives ten wrong passcodes and no more, so a recovery you attempt in a hurry with half-remembered codes can destroy it.
4. Keep a key that stays for the accounts that matter
Pick the accounts whose loss you could not repair: the email address that resets everything else, the main bank account, the Apple Account itself. Where the service accepts them, register a hardware security key on each, and a second one stored somewhere else, since a device-bound key has no backup by definition. Apple’s guide points to security keys for signing in to an Apple Account and to saving a passkey on a hardware key. This is the split from my hardware wallet deep dive, between a key that cannot leave its chip and everything built around it, applied to sign-in.
5. Prune the circle
Every device signed in to your account with iCloud Keychain on holds a copy of every passkey, guarded by that device’s own passcode. An old iPad with a four-digit passcode is the weakest box in the set. Remove devices you no longer use from the account and erase them before they leave your hands. Apple notes that you should turn off Stolen Device Protection before you sell, give away, or trade in an iPhone. This is Taleb’s via negativa from Part 4: removing a copy lowers risk in a way you can predict.
6. In a product, accept synced passkeys and know what you are getting
A passkey from an iPhone tells your server that someone holding the private key approved this sign-in on this domain. It does not tell you which device, or that the key exists in only one place. NIST allows that at AAL2, subject to its requirements, and tells federal agencies to understand and check certain flags in the sign-in data when they accept syncable credentials. For actions that cannot be undone, such as a large transfer or a new payee, I would ask for something stronger, either a device-bound key or a second confirmation on a separate channel. Do not demand hardware attestation from consumers, because Corbado reports that Apple does not provide it for iCloud Keychain passkeys.
7. Treat fallback and recovery as the real perimeter
FIDO’s October index found that 90% of accounts at its 15 services could use a passkey and 42% had enrolled one. Biometric Update’s summary is that passwords remain deeply embedded and that closing the gap between enrollment and regular use is now the central challenge. An account that has a passkey and still accepts its old password can be phished through the password. Measure how many sign-ins by enrolled users still go through a password, and set a date to stop offering it to them. Design account recovery with the care you gave sign-in, because an attacker will take whichever is weaker.
| Threat | Passkey protocol | Enclave and attempt counter | Stolen Device Protection | Two-factor account and escrow limit | Second, device-bound key |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Phishing page | |||||
| Website breach | |||||
| Stolen locked device | |||||
| Stolen device and passcode | |||||
| Apple Account takeover | |||||
| Every device lost |
The enclave column is strong in exactly one row. That matches what it is, a mechanism that makes data on a locked device useless without the passcode. The passkey’s resistance to phishing and breaches comes from the protocol, and its survival after device loss comes from iCloud.
Where to start
On your own devices
Change the passcode to something longer today. Turn on Stolen Device Protection and set it to Always. Add a recovery contact. Buy two security keys and register them on your main email account and on any bank that accepts them.
In your product
Accept synced passkeys for sign-in. Require a device-bound factor or a separate confirmation for irreversible actions. Count the password sign-ins made by users who already have a passkey, and set a date to bring that number to zero.
Sources
- FIDO Alliance counts 7 billion passkeys as adoption gains momentum, Biometric Update via FIDO Alliance
- Manually copying login keychain files from one Mac to another no longer works on Secure Enclave-equipped Macs running macOS Tahoe, Der Flounder
- Security vendors join forces to make passkeys more portable for everyone, Bitwarden
- New exploit bypasses Apple’s boot defenses, affects millions of iPhones, SecurityWeek
- FIDO Alliance, Wikipedia
- SP 800-63B-4, Appendix B: Syncable Authenticators, NIST
- Use Stolen Device Protection on your iPhone, Apple Personal Safety User Guide
- Passkeys, Michael Tsai blog, with a comment by Glenn Fleishman
- Vulnerability in iOS Secure Enclave could be security risk, Macworld
- Face ID Security Guide, Apple, November 2017
- The Secure Enclave, Apple Platform Security
- About the security of passkeys, Apple Support
- FIDO Passkey Index October 2026: what the numbers mean for your roadmap, MojoAuth
- Where are passkeys stored on macOS?, Corbado
- Can I use passkeys locally on a Mac without iCloud?, Apple Community
- Ask HN: Why do we need “Passkeys”, Hacker News
- Protecting keys with the Secure Enclave, Apple Developer Documentation
- With iOS 26, Apple is solving one of the biggest passkey headaches, 9to5Mac
- Hardware wallets, Part 3: Vaults across devices, Zenpanik
- Keychain data protection, Apple Platform Security
- Secure keychain syncing, Apple Platform Security
- Set up iCloud Keychain, Apple Support
- About Apple security certifications, Apple Security Certifications and Compliance Center
- Intro to Apple security assurance, Apple Security Certifications and Compliance Center
- kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave, Apple Developer Documentation
- CryptoKit SecureEnclave private keys and extraction, Apple Developer Forums
- Uses for Optic ID, Face ID, and Touch ID, Apple Platform Security
- device/fido/mac/make_credential_operation.h, Chromium source code
- device/fido/mac/authenticator.h, Chromium source code
- Chrome on Mac, Corbado glossary
- Apple details Touch ID and the A7’s Secure Enclave in updated iOS security document, TechCrunch
- Optic ID, Face ID, Touch ID, passcodes, and passwords, Apple Platform Security
- CVE-2025-31200 and CVE-2025-31201: 0-click iMessage chain, Full Disclosure mailing list, June 2025
- New Apple exploit exposes millions of iPhones worldwide, no software fix available, TechRepublic
- Use passkeys in iPhone and iPad, Apple Platform Support
- Escrow security for iCloud Keychain, Apple Platform Security
- Keybags for Data Protection, Apple Platform Security
- Apple embraces passkey portability in iOS 26, iDrop News
- About Stolen Device Protection for iPhone, Apple Support
- SP 800-63B-4, Authentication Assurance Levels, NIST
- iOS 26 passkeys: passkey enhancements analysis (WWDC25), Corbado
- Nassim Nicholas Taleb, letter to Stewart Brand, Artangel Longplayer Letters, July 3, 2013
- Nassim Nicholas Taleb, On the difference between a large stone and a thousand pebbles, Antifragile draft chapter
- The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, Wikipedia
- Two clocks, Part 2: The quantum clock, Zenpanik
- Hardware wallets, randomness, and the vaults behind every device, Zenpanik