Two clocks: quantum breaks the math, AI breaks everything around it
Quantum computers will eventually break the cryptography itself. AI is already breaking the processes around it, faster than most organizations can change them.
By Pavel Nikolov, November 11, 2026RSA, the public-key system behind most web certificates and a large part of banking infrastructure, rests on one asymmetry. Multiplying two secret primes p and q into N = p × q takes microseconds, while recovering p and q from N is, as far as anyone knows, extremely slow. Whoever factors N can compute the private key. In 1991 RSA Laboratories published a list of such numbers of growing size as an open test, and the largest one factored so far is the public measure of how far attackers are from the 2,048-bit keys in use today.
In September 2026 that record moved twice in sixteen days. On September 3, Eric Lu of Cognition published a factor of RSA-260, an 862-bit number. On September 19, Steve Weis of Anthropic published both factors of RSA-896. The previous record, the 829-bit RSA-250, took an academic team about 2,700 CPU core-years in 2020, the equivalent of one processor core running for 2,700 years.
Neither team found new mathematics. Both used the general number field sieve, the fastest known factoring method since the 1990s. Its running time grows faster than any polynomial in the number of digits but slower than an exponential, so every digit added to a key multiplies the attacker's work. Lu had Cognition's Devin agent build a GPU version of CADO-NFS, the open-source implementation of the sieve, and run it on about $400,000 of GPU time. Weis had Claude port the same software to GPUs and orchestrate up to 2,048 idle GPUs for ten days, about 30 GPU-years. Weis wrote that there were no new algorithmic factoring improvements and no new threats to deployed keys. Lu estimated that a hyperscaler or frontier AI lab could now factor a 1,024-bit RSA key for about $30 million. Standards retired 1,024-bit keys years ago, but they survive in old devices and certificates, so the estimate puts a price on breaking keys that are still in service.
The two teams left the mathematics where it was and cut the cost of applying it. AI is doing the same to every process wrapped around cryptography. In my last deep dive, on hardware wallets, nearly every large loss came from the process around the key.
Binance lost about $6.34 billion on October 29, 2026. Its November 3 incident report describes a months-long campaign: a tampered software download compromised one wallet engineer in June, a fake job interview compromised another in September, and on October 20 the attackers used an internal AI tool to take over two wallet engineers' machines, one of which held a container deployment token, a credential that lets its holder run software inside the production systems. The report describes no broken cryptography. Every step used access that a compromised person, laptop or tool already had. In this piece I look at two forces now working on cryptography from two directions, at very different speeds.
Quantum attacks the math
Shor's algorithm, published in 1994, factors a number in time that grows only polynomially with its length, but it needs a large quantum computer to run. On such a machine it would recover private keys from public keys for RSA and for elliptic curves. No such machine exists yet. When one does, it breaks the math everywhere at once, including traffic recorded years earlier.
AI attacks everything around the math
AI goes after the code that implements the algorithms, the way systems are configured, the ceremonies in which organizations generate their most important keys, the people who approve transactions, and the machines allowed to sign them. This is happening now, it improves with every model release, and it turns discovery work that took experts months into hours.
I think of them as two clocks. The quantum clock is slow, and nobody knows when it will strike. Each new research paper moves its hands forward, and when it strikes, the damage reaches back in time, because anyone who recorded encrypted traffic years earlier can then decrypt it. The AI clock is fast and already running. It needs no breakthrough. It speeds up with every model release and every tool built on one.
Nassim Taleb's test for fragility separates the two. In his 2013 letter to Stewart Brand, he defines fragility as a nonlinear response: a fragile object suffers more from one large shock than from many small shocks of the same total size, the way a large stone hurts more than the same weight in pebbles. In mathematical terms the harm is a convex function of the shock, so doubling the shock more than doubles the damage. Taleb and Raphaël Douady later defined fragility mathematically as nonlinear sensitivity to volatility. Quantum is the stone, one event that breaks RSA and elliptic curves everywhere at once. AI throws pebbles: thousands of small attacks on code, configuration and people, arriving faster each year. A system can survive the pebbles and still break on the stone, and the reverse holds too.
The two clocks collide during the migration. Defending against quantum means replacing every public-key algorithm in production: new libraries, new certificates, larger keys, hybrid modes that run an old and a new algorithm side by side, new key ceremonies and new hardware firmware. Each of those changes is new code and new process, which is the surface AI attacks. The migration runs on compliance timetables, where validating one cryptographic module, the government certification that banks and agencies require before they can deploy it, often takes 18 months or longer. Exploits now arrive in under a day on average after a vulnerability is disclosed. The gap between those two speeds is several hundred to one.
Processes are never perfect. They need continuous improvement, and the improvements now have to land faster than the attacks. Part 2 explains what quantum breaks and how quickly the estimates are falling. Part 3 maps the layers AI attacks, with recent cases. Part 4 shows where the clocks collide during migration. Part 5 sets out a posture for fintechs, banks and custodians.
Two clocks on one timeline, 2019 to 2026
Every event in this piece, newest first. The tag shows which clock it belongs to: quantum progress, AI-driven attacks, implementation flaws, or the policy deadlines that respond to them. Each name links to its source, and the right-hand link goes to the part that covers it.
AI moved the factoring record without new math
Classical factoring records used to take years of work by small expert teams. RSA-250 fell in February 2020, so six and a half years passed before RSA-260, although CADO-NFS was open source the whole time and GPUs kept getting faster. In September each researcher directed an AI agent to do the engineering: rewrite a mature CPU codebase for GPUs, schedule the work across idle chips, and keep a ten-day run alive. The scarce resource had been the handful of people able to run such a computation, and the agents did most of that work.
Factoring difficulty grows much faster than key length. NIST rates 1,024-bit RSA at about 80 bits of security and 2,048-bit RSA at 112 bits, a gap of 232, or about four billion times more work for the best known attack. So 896 bits is still far from 2048. The cost of applying known methods is what moved. The AI clock works through that same mechanism at every layer: finding implementation bugs, writing exploits, producing convincing fake executives. There is one exception so far, covered in Part 4. In July an AI model found new mathematics against HAWK, a young post-quantum signature candidate.
What each clock threatens
The two threats differ in what they target, when they arrive, how the damage spreads, and who controls the response.
| Quantum clock | AI clock | |
|---|---|---|
| What it attacks | The public-key math: RSA, Diffie-Hellman, ECDH, ECDSA, EdDSA, Schnorr | Everything around the math: implementations, configurations, key lifecycle, people, automated signers. For young schemes, the math as well (Part 4) |
| When | No capable machine yet. Expert views run from “cannot rule out 2029” to “unlikely before 2035” (Part 2) | Now, and faster with each model release |
| How damage spreads | All at once and backwards in time: recorded traffic and exposed public keys fall together | Continuously, one target at a time: a bug, an approval, a signer |
| Defense | A migration: new algorithms, new keys, new certificates | A loop: find, fix, verify and repeat, faster than the attacker |
| Who sets the pace | Standards bodies and regulators | Your own engineering and operations teams |
Quantum readiness fits a project plan with a budget and an end date. The AI clock has no end date, and attackers exploit the habits that big migration projects create: long change freezes, batched releases, and approvals that take longer than the exploit.
Continue to Part 2: The quantum clock