The coat check: card tokens, vaults, and who can ask for the number back
A token takes the card number out of a shop's systems and moves it into a vault. The thefts moved too, to the checkout page and to the desk where tokens are issued.
By Pavel Nikolov, November 16, 2026A payment card number works like a password that you hand to every shop you buy from. Anyone who copies the number and the expiration date can try to spend with them. The card business's answer is tokenization, which the payment company Shift4 first applied to card data in 2005. The shop keeps a substitute value, called a token. The real number sits in a better-guarded system called a vault.
On October 27, 2026, Visa's chief executive Ryan McInerney told investors that more than 60% of all e-commerce transactions on its network are now tokenized. He added that over half of all available Visa credentials have a token, more than double the share five years ago. McInerney counted 5.2 billion credentials, and I read the word as meaning the cards and accounts on Visa's network.
Two days later the fashion retailer Revolve told the US Securities and Exchange Commission that an intruder may have obtained the names, card numbers and expiration dates of customers who had saved a card in their account. The commission is the regulator that publicly traded US companies report to. Revolve has since reported 1,515,073 affected people to Indiana's attorney general.
On November 13 the ticket seller Fandango filed a notice with California's attorney general. It says that card numbers, security codes and expiration dates from purchases on its checkout page between October 8 and 11 could have been accessed. The security code is the three or four digits printed on the card. An online shop asks for it as a sign that the buyer has the card in hand.
Revolve's filing says the data may have been obtained “through automated means” and does not say how the numbers were stored. If the filing is right, full card numbers were within reach of whoever got into the shopping platform. Fandango's notice concerns the checkout page, where a customer types the number before any token exists. In the weeks when Visa reported that most of its online payments carry a token, two US companies told customers that their real numbers may have been taken, and neither report describes a break-in at a vault.
This is the pattern from my earlier deep dives. In the one on hardware wallets, nearly every large loss came from the process around the key. In Two clocks, attackers reached the service that signs withdrawals at Binance and it signed for them. Card tokens work the same way. In the cases I collected for this piece nobody broke into a vault. The card numbers were taken before they went in or from shops that never put them in, and in other cases a token was issued to the wrong person.
In this piece I look at the two kinds of card token, where each one puts the real number, and where the attacks went.
The two kinds differ in how many of the parties to a payment see the real number, so the parties come first. A card payment passes through four of them. The merchant sends it to its acquirer. The acquirer is the merchant's bank, and a company called a payment processor often handles the traffic on its behalf, so I use the word processor for both. The processor passes the payment to the card network, such as Visa or Mastercard. The network passes it to the issuing bank. The issuing bank gave the customer the card, and it decides whether to approve the payment.
Vault tokens hide the number
A merchant, a processor or an independent vault company such as VGS stores the card number and gives the merchant's systems a stand-in. The stand-in is a random value with no mathematical link to the number. Only the vault can turn it back, and it does so each time the merchant charges the card. The number still travels on to the processor, the card network and the issuing bank.
Network tokens replace the number
Visa, Mastercard and the other card networks issue a different number for one card at one merchant or on one phone. For a payment the customer starts, it has to arrive with a one-time code computed for that payment. A merchant cannot work back from it to the real number. Only the network and the issuing bank can match it to the account.
I think of tokenization as a coat check. You hand over your coat and get a numbered ticket. A thief who steals the ticket has a piece of paper, and the coat stays in the back room. That leaves three ways to get a coat. Take one that is not in the back room, because its owner is still carrying it through the lobby or the shop kept it on its own rack. Persuade the attendant at the counter to hand one over. Or get the attendant at the ticket desk to write you a ticket for someone else's coat.
A token moves the card number into someone else's back room, and the number still exists there. The checkout page is the lobby. A merchant database that still holds numbers is the rack. Enrolling a card means getting a token issued for it, and enrollment is the ticket desk. The vault's interface for turning a token back into a number is the counter. The cases from 2025 and 2026 in this piece happened in the lobby, on the rack or at the ticket desk. The counter is where I expect the next ones, for reasons I set out in Part 4.
The back rooms are getting large. VGS said on September 22 that it stores more than 10 billion tokens, twice as many as a year earlier, and adds more than a billion a month. Visa issued its 10 billionth token in June 2024. Mastercard says three in five of its e-commerce transactions in Europe are tokenized and aims for 100% by 2030. I read these numbers as card data collecting in a small number of vaults.
Part 2 explains vault tokens: what a card number is made of, why a mathematical fingerprint of it fails as protection, and how a vault such as VGS keeps the number off a merchant's servers. Part 3 explains network tokens, the one-time codes that stop them being reused, and who controls them. Part 4 follows the number to the places where it is still taken and applies Nassim Taleb's tests for fragility to a vault that holds billions of cards. Part 5 is what I would do about it.
Tokens and breaches on one timeline, 2005 to 2026
Every event in this piece, newest first. The tag shows what kind of event it is: a vault token, a network token, a breach, or a rule or standard. Each name links to its source, and the right-hand link goes to the part that covers it.
Where the real number is
The plainest way to compare the designs is to ask who handles the real number in each. In the table below a filled amber dot means the party sees or stores the number, a teal ring means it handles a token, and a dash means it handles neither.
| Design | Checkout page | Merchant's servers | Token vault | Processor | Card network | Issuing bank |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No tokens | ||||||
| Vault token | ||||||
| Network token for a saved card | ||||||
| Phone wallet |
Reading down the columns shows what each step buys. A vault token clears the merchant's servers. A network token clears the processor as well. A phone wallet clears the checkout page, because the phone sends a token and the shopper types nothing. The card network and the issuing bank keep the number in every row, since they are the ones who have to find the account.
Two tokens side by side
The two kinds differ in who issues them, who can reverse them and what a thief can do with a stolen one.
| Vault token | Network token | |
|---|---|---|
| Who issues it | The merchant, its processor, or an independent vault company such as VGS | A card network's token service, when a merchant, wallet or processor asks for one |
| What it replaces | The card number inside one company's systems | The card number along the whole route from the merchant to the card network |
| Who can turn it back | The vault, for any caller it trusts | Only the card network and the issuing bank |
| What stops reuse | The vault's access rules. The token itself carries no limits | A one-time code, called a cryptogram, and limits on where the token works |
| What it protects | Card numbers stored in the merchant's databases, logs and backups | A stolen credential being used at another merchant or in another channel |
| Where it stays exposed | The checkout page, the vault, and every caller allowed to redeem a token | Enrollment. Whoever passes the bank's check gets a working token |
| Who controls it | The merchant, if the vault is independent of its processor | The card network, which also sets the fees |
Sources for the table: the PCI tokenization guidelines, the PCI council's FAQ on payment tokens, Evervault's guide to network tokens and Fintech Wrap Up on merchant-owned tokens. Parts 2 and 3 go through each row. The wording of the cells is mine.
The two can be stacked. An AI agent is a program built on a language model that carries out a task, such as a purchase, on its own. Sam Boboev's Fintech Wrap Up deep dive on shopping by AI agents, The hidden liability of agentic commerce, recommends what he calls a dual-tier approach. The merchant owns a universal token, and it resolves to a network token wherever one is supported. By universal he means a token that is not tied to one processor. As I read it, the merchant's own systems then store neither a card number nor anything the networks would accept from a stranger.
Continue to Part 2: Vault tokens